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 ABSTRACT 
Export Orientation and Domestic Merger Policy: Theory and Some 
Empirical Evidence*
by Joseph A. Clougherty and Anming Zhang 
The recent ‘open-economy industrial organization’ literature generally finds 
export-orientation to enhance the weight of post-merger international 
competitive gains; thereby, favoring lenient domestic merger policy. We 
observe, however, that mergers seldom generate the ‘significant synergies’ that 
are supportive of international competitive gains. Further, we explore a joint-
economies of production effect which suggests that domestic mergers tend to 
generate international competitive losses (not gains). Accordingly, we contend 
that export-orientation favors strict (not lenient) domestic merger policy. In order 
to support this contention, we develop a model illustrative of how non-
synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might 
reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger-reviews. Further, using a 
panel data set composed of U.S. merger policy by manufacturing sector over 
the 1990-2001 period, we empirically support export-orientation leading to strict 
merger policy.  
 
 
Keywords:  open-economy, merger-policy, export-orientation, antitrust 
JEL Classification:  L40, F10 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Exportorientierung und nationale Fusionspolitik: Theorie und empirische 
Belege 
In der neueren Literatur zur Industrieökonomie in offenen Volkswirtschaften wird 
allgemein herausgestellt, dass die Zunahme internationaler Wettbewerbs-
vorteile durch eine Fusion umso stärker ins Gewicht fällt, je höher die 
Exportorientierung der Volkswirtschaft ist. Mithin wird eine nachsichtige 
nationale Fusionskontrolle befürwortet. Im Gegensatz dazu stellen wir fest, dass 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse oft nicht die beabsichtigten signifi-kanten 
Synergieeffekte haben, die die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des 
Unternehmens tatsächlich stärken würden. Stattdessen führen Fusionen eher 
zu internationalen Wettbewerbsnachteilen. Eine Ursache dafür finden wir im 
„joint economies of production - Effekt“, den wir hier näher untersuchen. 
Entsprechend kommen wir zu der Auffassung, dass die Exportorientierung einer 
Volkswirtschaft statt für eine nachsichtige eher für eine strenge Fusions-
kontrolle spricht.  
 
Das von uns entwickelte Modell veranschaulicht, wie Fusionen von Unter-
nehmen, bei denen der Synergieeffekt ausbleibt, in einer offenen Volkswirt-
schaft die Wohlfahrt des Landes reduzieren, und lässt erkennen, dass diese 
Auswirkungen strengere Fusionsprüfungen nahe legen. Auch empirisch 
belegen wir unsere These über den Zusammenhang von Exportorientierung 
und strengerer Fusionspolitik anhand von Paneldaten der Jahre 1990-2001, in 
denen die US-amerikanischen Fusionsentscheidungen nach den Sektoren des 
produzierenden Gewerbes geordnet zusammengefasst sind. 
 
iv 
1. Introduction 
 
 Merger policy has traditionally been the purview of relatively large nations—
nations with sizable stakes in securing domestic efficiency (Boner and Krueger, 1991). 
The trade dimensions of merger policy consequently received scant attention by the 
economic literature, as trade effects were relatively unimportant for such domestically 
oriented nations (Richardson, 1999). Two trends appear to be reversing this 
disconnection between domestic merger policy and international trade orientation. First, a 
number of relatively small nations (subject to greater trade effects) have introduced or 
strengthened merger policies over the last two decades (World Investment Report, 2000). 
For instance, The Netherlands—the epitome of a small open-economy—has recently 
implemented a relatively sound competition policy. Second, continued 
internationalization of the world economy suggests that even large nations are 
increasingly concerned about trade effects. For instance, the former top U.S. antitrust 
regulator stated “globalization has radically changed the focus of our work, from almost 
purely domestic less than 10 years ago to a heavy international component today” 
(Melamed, 2000). Accordingly, a growing dialogue exists on the design and conduct of 
merger policy in an open economy setting: see Horn and Levinsohn (2001) for a short 
review of the budding literature referred to as ‘open-economy industrial organization’. 
 
Central to the above dialogue is the impact of trade-orientation (specifically, the 
composite export and import orientations) on the optimal tenor of domestic merger 
policy. The impact of import-orientation is relatively uncontroversial: imports curb the 
pricing behavior of domestic firms (Levinsohn, 1993; Harrison, 1994); hence, the more 
import-oriented an industrial sector, the less anxious need antitrust officials be with 
regard to domestic merger activity (Landes and Posner, 1981; Abbot, 1985; Ghosal, 
2002). From this established basis, we get the common argument that trade and 
competition policies are substitutes. However, the impact of export-orientation on 
domestic merger policy is somewhat more controversial, as it raises the possibility of 
strategic merger policy for international competitive gains. While Acquier and Caves 
(1979) first formally examined the tradeoffs between domestic consumer welfare and 
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international profits, recent scholarship within the ‘open-economy industrial 
organization’ literature (hereafter, open-economy IO) has considered the impact of 
export-orientation on optimal domestic merger policy. Strikingly—and despite invoking 
various oligopolistic scenarios—these scholars (Barros and Cabral, 1994; Levinsohn, 
1997; Sorgard, 1997; Head and Ries, 1997; Yano, 2001; Zhang and Chen, 2002) 
consistently find export-orientation to conditionally favor lenient domestic merger policy 
under a national-welfare criterion. The main insight being that international competitive 
gains have a particularly strong weight vis-à-vis domestic consumer-losses when an 
economy is a big exporter. Such foundations for strategic merger policy—despite 
involving more nuance than the classic national champion rationale (e.g., Caves, 1982)—
run counter to mainstream economic intuition; yet, only the sketchings of a critique have 
been lodged (see Bliss, 1997; Horn and Levinsohn, 2001). 
 
We have a few concerns with regard to the open-economy IO literature’s holding 
that export-orientation favors lax domestic merger policy. First, we know of no empirical 
work that tests the relationship between export-orientation and actual merger policy; thus, 
it is time for this theoretical conformity to be tested. Second, such arguments (e.g., Zhang 
and Chen, 2002) often posit post-merger synergies despite a sobering literature in finance 
economics and industrial organization that suggests most mergers do not generate 
synergies (see Sirower, 1997 and Mueller, 1997 for reviews). For instance, Gugler et al. 
(2003) find—in the most comprehensive empirical study to date—only thirty percent of 
mergers to be efficiency-enhancing in the sense that both merging firms and consumers 
gain post-merger. Instead, market-power and other (e.g., hubris) motives appear to drive 
most merger activity. The two concerns above—lack of empirical confirmation and 
prevalence of synergistic-less mergers—raise the possibility that domestic mergers may 
commonly lead to international competitive losses (not gains). 
 
 Accordingly, we question—and empirically test—the prevailing relationship 
between export-orientation and optimal merger policy, and contend that export-
orientation generally favors more stringent (not more lenient) domestic merger policy. In 
delivering on our contention that export-orientation leads to strict domestic merger 
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policy, we first develop a model to illustrate that domestic mergers—under conditions of 
no-synergies and joint-economies of production between domestic and international 
markets—generate international-competitive-losses: what we term a joint-economies 
effect. Next, testing for consistent empirical evidence on comprehensive panel data for 
U.S. merger policy, we find manufacturing sectors characterized by greater export-
orientations to experience stricter merger policy.  
 
In sum, we contend that the intuition behind ‘the optimality of lenient merger 
policy in exporting sectors’ may be mistaken; or better said, the intuition may be correct 
but the conditions may not often hold. Instead of commonly resulting in international 
competitive gains and enhanced national welfare, lenient merger policy may commonly 
result in international competitive losses and reduced national welfare. This negative 
welfare effect will be particularly strong when nations are big exporters; hence, 
suggesting the optimality of strict merger policy in exporting sectors. The remainder of 
the paper is organized as follows to support the main contention. Section 2 sets up the 
basic model, and Section 3 examines the effects of a domestic merger on output, price, 
profit and national welfare. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 
5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
 
 We consider a two-country model that is likely to be the simplest structure in 
which our main problem can be addressed. In country 1 (the ‘domestic’ market), there are 
initially two firms, A and B, competing with each other. Of the two firms, firm A also 
competes with a foreign firm, C, in Country 2 (the ‘foreign’ market). Let  denote output 
level. Further, let  and  respectively denote firm A’s outputs in countries 1 and 2, 
 firm B’s output in country 1, and  firm C’s output in country 2.
q
1Aq 2Aq
1Bq 2Cq 1 Firms A and B 
produce differentiated, imperfectly substitutable products, with (inverse) demand 
functions in the domestic market given by  and . For ),( 11 BAA qqp ),( 11 BAB qqp
                                                 
1  Note this notation indicates which firm is producing for where (i.e., country 1 or 2). 
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simplicity, assume that  and  are homogeneous in the foreign market, with 
 being the demand function and .  
2Aq 2Cq
)( 222
CA qqp + 0)/)(('2 <≡⋅ dqdpp
 
 Using ci to denote total costs for firm i (i = A, B, C), the profits of the three firms 
may be written as: 
 
)()(),(),,,( 212222
1112121 AA
A
ACAABAACBAAA qqcqqqpqqqpqqqq +−++=π , (1) 
)(),(),( 111111 BB
BBABBAB qcqqqpqq −=π ,      (2) 
)()(),( 22222
22 C
C
CCACAC qcqqqpqq −+=π .     (3) 
 
We assume that there are joint economies in firm A’s production:2
 
0)("2121 >⋅−=∂∂
∂≡ AAA
A
A
AA cqq
ππ .       (4) 
 
Suppose that firms choose quantities to maximize their profits and that the exporting 
firm, firm A, chooses its profit-maximizing quantities for each country separately. Prior 
to a merger between A and B, therefore, firm A chooses  and , firm B chooses 
 and firm C chooses  to maximize their respective profits. This would yield a pre-
merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
1Aq 2Aq
1Bq 2Cq
 3
 
 The merger between A and B is conceived and modeled as follows. In general, 
when merging firms produce differentiated products, the merger less likely leads to the 
                                                 
2  More generally, the total cost of firm A may be written as . Then condition (4) will 
become 
),( 21 AAA qqc
021
2
<∂∂
∂
AA
A
qq
c . That is, an increase in  will reduce the marginal cost of  and 
vice versa, which suggests joint-economies (or economies of scope) in firm A’s production of two 
outputs. Our results in this paper extend to this more general case. 
1Aq 2Aq
3  Our set-up may be considered as a two-country trade model with ‘segmented’ markets (Brander, 
1981; Brander and Krugman, 1983), in that firm A chooses its quantities  and  for each 
country. It is noted nevertheless that the fact the markets are segmented does not necessarily imply 
firm A chooses the profit-maximizing quantities for each country separately since there are cost 
synergies in the present model.    
1Aq 2Aq
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shutdown of the respective production facilities of the acquiring and target firms. 
Specifically, firms A and B continue to produce their outputs post-merger, but rather than 
choose their outputs non-cooperatively, they choose outputs to maximize joint profit. We 
focus then on the type of merger in which participants continue to produce their 
respective products, but coordinate their post-merger pricing and output decisions.4 With 
this as a backdrop, we go on to explore how a joint-economies effect suggests that lenient 
merger policy for such mergers might result in international competitive losses and 
reduced national welfare.  
 
As an aside, additional effects may link lenient merger policy with international 
competitive losses and reduced national welfare. For instance, Bliss (1997) and Horn and 
Levinsohn (2001) point out that the recent open-economy IO literature under-appreciates 
how the number of domestic firms may positively impact export levels. Thus if firms 
compete a la Cournot, then reducing the number of home competitors in international 
markets—via lenient merger policy—would result in decreased exports and lower 
national welfare: a reduced-competitors effect. The basic model we begin presenting here 
has abstracted from the reduced-competitors effect by assuming that the number of firms 
in both the domestic and foreign markets remain unchanged following the merger. 
Nevertheless, our model could be extended to include pre-merger international 
competition by the acquiring and target firms in order to illustrate the negative impact of 
fewer home competitors on post-merger exports. While we currently refrain from such an 
extension so as to concentrate on the joint-economies effect, we would not want it 
                                                 
4  Some Canadian examples of a no-shutdown merger include: i) In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Southam newspaper chain (which owned the two major newspapers, The Vancouver Sun and The 
Province, in Vancouver, British Columbia) bought a large number of community newspapers in the 
Greater Vancouver area yet continued operating them. ii) In late 1998 Loblaw, a fully integrated 
food distribution company in Canada, purchased Provigo Inc., the largest retailer/wholesaler in 
Quebec—the merger of two supermarket chains—but since they operated in somewhat different 
markets (Provigo was mostly in Quebec where Loblaw was weak) there were virtually no store 
closures. iii) In 2001, Best Buy Co., Inc. bought Future Shop Ltd while it was planning to enter 
(having already signed some leases) Canada; nevertheless, it maintained the Future Shop brand when 
it eventually opened Canadian Best Buy stores. iv) The convergence mergers in broadcasting and 
telecommunications in the late 1990s and early 2000s would also be examples (e.g., BCE owning the 
Globe and Mail and the CTV television network). Some recent U.S. examples of a no-shutdown 
merger are disucussed in details in Sibley and Heyer (2003), whereas recent international examples 
include the completed Air France / KLM merger and the proposed Qantas/Air New Zealand merger. 
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construed that we figure joint-economies to be the sole driver behind a lenient-merger-
policy / international-competitive-losses connection. 
 
Returning to the base model, we aim to compare the post-merger with the pre-
merger equilibria in terms of output, price, profit, and national welfare. Unfortunately, it 
is extremely difficult to directly compare the pre-merger and post-merger price and 
welfare levels—even in special cases. To overcome this difficulty, we introduce 
differential techniques. More specifically, as a useful analytical tool, we formulate the 
industrial structure problem as follows: 
 
);,,,( 2121
,, 2121
θπθππ CBAAAB
qq
BA
qq
qqqqMaxMax
AAAA
≡+ ,    (5) 
);,,,( 2121
11
θπθππ CBAABA
q
AB
q
qqqqMaxMax
BB
≡+ ,     (6) 
),( 22
2
CAC
q
qqMax
C
π .         (7) 
 
Clearly, θ  = 0 and 1 respectively correspond to the pre-merger and post-merger cases. 
Notice that both  and  are well defined when θ  = 0 or 1; furthermore, since  
and  are both linear combinations of two profit functions, any value of θ  between 0 
and 1 should also represent a conceivable profit function. Given these observations, 
switching from a pre-merger to a post-merger industrial structure can be calculated as the 
integral of small changes dθ . Such a small change may be referred to as an ‘infinitesimal 
merger,’ and it turns out to be easy to sign the welfare effect of an infinitesimal merger. 
Consequently, the overall effect of the merger can also be determined because it will 
have the same sign as the effect of an infinitesimal merger whenever the latter sign does 
not change in the range of 
ABπ BAπ ABπ
BAπ
10 ≤≤θ  — a condition that one can check.5 For much of the 
analysis, therefore, we shall treat θ  as a continuous variable between 0 and 1. 
 
                                                 
5  Note that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Oum, Zhang 
and Zhang (1995) used a similar technique in their analysis of horizontal merger effects and airline 
hubbing effects, respectively.  
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 Given parameter θ, the Cournot equilibrium is characterized by first-order 
conditions of the profit-maximization problem (5)-(7), with subscripts denoting partial 
derivatives: 
 
0);,,,( 111
2121
1 =+=∂
∂≡ BAAAA
AB
CBAAAB
A q
qqqq θπππθπ ,     (8) 
0);,,,( 2
2121
2 == AACBAAABA qqqq πθπ ,       (9) 
0);,,,( 11
2121
1 =+= ABBBCBAABAB qqqq θππθπ ,      (10) 
0),( 2
22
2 == CCCACC qq ππ ,        (11) 
 
and second-order conditions: 
 
0,0,0,0,0 2211122122112211 <<>−<< C CCBABBABAAABAAABAAABAAABAAABAA ππππππππ . (12) 
 
In examining the equilibrium, we impose certain regularity conditions. Since  and 
 are (imperfect) substitutes in the domestic market, we have: 
1Aq
1Bq
 
0,0)( 111 <<∂
∂≡ BAB
A
A
B pq
pp .        (13)  
 
Furthermore, following the standard practice in models of quantity competition, we 
assume that   and  are ‘strategic substitutes’ (e.g., Bulow, Geanakoplow and 
Klemperer, 1985; Tirole, 1988): 
1Aq 1Bq
 
0,0 1111 << B ABA BA ππ .         (14) 
 
That is, firm A’s (B’s) marginal profit (or equivalently, revenue) declines when the 
output of firm B (A) rises. Since , we have  if . A BA
AA
B
A
BA pqp 11
1
111 +=π 011 <A BAπ 011 ≤A BAp
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Therefore, the fact that the outputs of A and C are substitutes provides a sufficient 
condition for (14). Similarly, in the foreign market,  and  are strategic substitutes 
so that: 
2Aq 2Cq
 
0,0 2222 << C ACA CA ππ .        (15) 
 
 The comparative static effects of the merger variable θ on the equilibrium outputs, 
denoted  , are derived by totally differentiating the first-order conditions (8)-(11): )(θiq
 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
0
0
00
00
0
0
1
1
2
1
2
1
2222
1111
222212
112111
A
B
B
A
C
B
A
A
C
CC
C
AC
BA
BB
BA
AB
AB
CA
AB
AA
AB
AA
AB
BA
AB
AA
AB
AA
q
q
q
q
π
π
ππ
ππ
πππ
πππ
θ
θ
θ
θ
,     (16) 
 
where  and . Notice equations (16) have already been 
simplified, with , , , , , and . 
Since , for 
example, it follows that  and . For the comparative static analysis of 
(16) to be useful, we assume that the equilibrium is locally strictly stable — which 
implies the following: i) the determinant 
2,1,2,1 CBAAi = θθθ ddqq ii /)(≡
021 =ABCAπ 012 =ABBAπ 021 =BAABπ 021 =BACBπ 012 =C ACπ 012 =C BCπ
]),([)](),([ 1111
1'1
1
11
111
ABAA
B
B
B
BB
B
BABA
B
B
B
BA
B qqqpqcqpqqp θθπππ +−+=+=
021 =BAABπ 021 =BACBπ
ijπ of the 44×  matrix, ijπ , in (16) is positive; 
ii) in the absence of the foreign market, the domestic market would still be strictly stable, 
hence ; and iii) in the absence of the domestic market, the 
foreign market would similarly still be strictly stable, hence  
(e.g., Bulow, Geanakoplow and Klemperer, 1985; Zhang and Zhang, 1996). 
011111111 >− BAABABBABABBABAA ππππ
022222222 >− C ACABCAC CCABAA ππππ
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3. Effects on Output, Price, Profit and Welfare 
 
To investigate the effect of a merger on national welfare, we first report the 
following result (the proof is given in Appendix A): 
 
Lemma 1.  i)  and  cannot both be positive; ii)  and  have the opposite 
signs; and iii)  and  have the same sign.  
1Aqθ
1Bqθ
2Aqθ
2Cqθ
1Aqθ
2Aqθ
 
Lemma 1 thus narrows down the sign combination of ( ) to only three 
possibilities: (i) , , ; (ii) , , ; and (iii) 
, , . Although Lemma 1 indicates three possibilities, it is 
eminently plausible – given strategic substitutes and other properties of Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium – that : an infinitesimal merger between firms A and B will make 
firm A provide less output in the domestic market. Or put differently, possibility (ii) of 
Lemma 1 may be ruled out. To see this, solving equations (16) for  and  yields: 
121 ,, BAA qqq θθθ
01 <Aqθ 02 <Aqθ 01 >Bqθ 01 >Aqθ 02 >Aqθ 01 <Bqθ
01 <Aqθ 02 <Aqθ 01 <Bqθ
01 <Aqθ
1Aqθ
2Aqθ
 
2
2212
222222221 A
C
CC
AB
AA
C
AC
AB
CA
C
CC
AB
AAA qq θθ ππ
ππππ −−= ,  
ij
C
CC
AB
AA
AB
BA
A
B
BA
BB
B
AAq π
ππππππ
θ
22121111112 )( +−= . (17) 
 
Since  by (4),  by (12), and  and 
determinant 
0"12 >−= AABAA cπ 022 <C CCπ 022222222 >− C ACABCAC CCABAA ππππ
0>ijπ  by the stability condition, both  and  must have the opposite 
sign of term . Furthermore, notice that the following condition has 
been used in models of quantity competition:  
1Aqθ
2Aqθ
BA
BB
B
A
AB
BA
A
B 111111 ππππ −
 
AB
BA
BA
BB 1111 ππ < ,          (18) 
 
which is among the weaker known stability conditions for Cournot equilibrium (Dixit, 
1986). Since  and , condition (18) would likely yield: 0111 <= AABAB qpπ 011 <= BBABA qpπ
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0111111 >− BABBBAABBAAB ππππ .        (19)  
 
Condition (19) holds, for example, when the marginal cost of )(⋅Bc  is linear and when the 
domestic demand functions,  and , are linear and reasonably 
symmetric.
),( 11 BAA qqp ),( 11 BAB qqp
6 Using Lemma 1 we then obtain the following result: 
   
Lemma 2.  Assuming condition (19), an infinitesimal merger between firms A and B 
gives rise to ,  and .  01 <Aqθ 02 <Aqθ 02 >Cqθ
 
Lemmas 1 and 2 may also be explained more intuitively using Figures 1 and 2. 
The figures show that an infinitesimal domestic merger will likely reduce firm A’s output 
in both the domestic and foreign market. In Figure 1, the pre-merger Nash equilibrium in 
the domestic market is given by point E: where the reaction functions for firms A and B – 
denoted RA and RB respectively – intersect and where firm A produces output . After 
the merger, the two firms will choose their quantities to maximize joint profits, and the 
post-merger equilibria will be along the dashed line passing through point J. As shown in 
the above mathematical derivations, given strategic substitutes and other properties of 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, it is eminently plausible that . Accordingly, post-
merger joint profit maximization likely induces a contraction in firm A’s domestic 
output. Moreover, this contraction raises the marginal cost of providing output in the 
foreign market due to the existence of joint economies [i.e., condition (4); or more 
EAq 1
EAJA qq 11 <
                                                 
6  Note that  and 
. With linear demand 
functions and , we have , where 
 and  by the stability condition and symmetric demands. This will give rise 
to (19) if the firms have identical costs (and hence ). Note, however, that the condition of 
symmetric demands does not necessarily imply that the two firms have symmetric (i.e., identical) 
costs. In particular, the cost difference between these two firms should lead firm A to sell more in 
the domestic market than firm B, i.e., . In that case it is shown, as follows, that (19) 
continues to hold (using the above discussion): 
)( 1111
1
111111111
BB
BA
B
A
AA
AB
A
B
B
BA
A
BA
AB
BA qppqpp +++=+= θθπππ
1
11
1"1
111111111 )(2
AA
BB
B
B
BB
BB
B
B
A
BB
B
BB
BA
BB qpqcqpp θθπππ +−+=+=
0" =Bc ABBABAABBAABBBBABB ppppp 111111111 2 πθπ =+≤+<=
A
B
B
B pp 11 < BABB pp 11 <
11 BA qq =
11 BA qq ≥
 . 0)( 111111
1
11
1
111
1
1111111 >−>−=− BABBBAABBAABABABBBBAABBAAABBABBBAABBAAB ppqqpqp ππππππππ
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generally, 021
2
<∂∂
∂
AA
A
qq
c as indicated in footnote 2] thereby leading to an output 
contraction in the foreign market as well.  
 
**** Figure 1 Here **** 
 
The foreign market equilibria are described in Figure 2, where EO denotes the pre-
merger equilibrium and EM the post-merger equilibrium. The left-ward shift of firm A’s 
reaction function illustrates how firm A produces less post-merger, and illustrates how 
the foreign firm (firm C) produces more post-merger. In terms of the impact on total 
output in the foreign market, we have: 
 
2
22
222222 )1()( AC
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C
ACCACA dqdqdqqqd π
π−=+=+ . 
 
To sign this term, we introduce the following condition, 
 
)()( 22'2
2" CAC
C qqpqc +> .        (20) 
 
That is, the foreign firm’s residual demand curve, , intersects its marginal cost 
curve from above. This condition is met if marginal cost  is constant or increasing, 
and is used in Farrell and Shapiro (1990). It is among the weaker known stability 
conditions for Cournot equilibrium (Dixit, 1986).  
)( 2'2 ⋅+Aqp
)(' ⋅Cc
 
**** Figure 2 Here **** 
 
Condition (20) implies that in the ( )-space the reaction function of firm A 
is steeper than that of firm C (as shown in Figure 2). In mathematical term, (20) implies 
that ; hence,  will have the same sign as : i.e., the 
change in the foreign market output will have the same sign as the change in domestic 
22 , CA qq
C
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C
CC 2222 ππ < )( 22 CA qqd + 2Adq
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export. Alternatively – and as shown in Figure 2 – the gain in foreign output will be less 
than the loss in domestic export. Given that , total output in the foreign market 
falls, and foreign prices correspondingly rise. 
02 <Aqθ
 
Proposition 1.  Assuming condition (19), the post-merger equilibrium consists of: 
i) firm A selling less in the domestic market, 
ii) firm A selling less, but firm C selling more, in the foreign market, 
iii) prices being higher in the foreign market, and 
iv) firm C earning greater profit if its post-merger fixed cost does not exceed its 
pre-merger fixed cost,  
relative to the pre-merger equilibrium (i.e., the no merger scenario). 
 
Proof:  Parts i)-iii) have been shown in the text. As for part iv), we have:  
022
2
2 >+= CCCACAC qq θθθ πππ ,  
because , , and  by (11). Thus, if C’s post-merger fixed 
cost does not exceed its pre-merger fixed cost, the merger enhances its profit. Q.E.D. 
02'22 <= CCA qpπ 02 <Aqθ 02 =CCπ
 
It is noted that under Lemma 2 or Proposition 1, the sign of  can be negative 
or positive. In effect, we can further show that , provided the merger benefits both 
partners (the proof is given in Appendix A):  
1Bqθ
01 <Bqθ
 
Lemma 3.  If a merger must benefit both partners, then , ,  and 
.  
01 <Aqθ 02 <Aqθ 01 <Bqθ
02 >Cqθ
 
Given, under Lemma 3, that  and  -- i.e., an infinitesimal merger 
results in output contraction by the merger partners -- then domestic prices will rise: 
 and . As a result, domestic 
consumers would be worse off post-merger. On the other hand, is there an incentive for 
01 <Aqθ 01 <Bqθ
011
1
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firms A and B to merge? Supposing that the merger decision is made so as to maximize 
joint profit, we can then obtain: 
 
1
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qq
d
d
θθ πθπθθ
ππ −+−=+ .        (21) 
 
The right-hand side of equation (21) is positive.7 The above discussions lead to the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 2.  If a merger must benefit both partners, the post-merger equilibrium 
consists of: 
i) firms A and B selling less in the domestic market, 
ii) firm A selling less, but firm C selling more, in the foreign market, 
iii) prices being higher in both markets, and 
iv) firm C and firms A and B jointly earning greater profits if in both cases the 
post-merger fixed costs do not exceed the pre-merger fixed costs,  
relative to the pre-merger equilibrium (i.e., the no merger scenario). 
 
The condition for Proposition 2 – that both partners must gain from a merger – is 
particularly reasonable in situations where the two firms produce differentiated products 
and continue to produce their outputs post-merger. Though in other situations, it might be 
too stringent. If this constraint were removed, then we would arrive at the results of 
Proposition 1. Fortunately, as will be seen below, only Proposition 1 is required for our 
joint-economies of production effect—an effect which suggests that domestic mergers 
involve international competitive losses, which in turn generates and formalizes our 
empirical tests. 
 
The basic intuition behind Propositions 1 and 2 is as follows. When two firms 
produce differentiated products, both may continue to operate out of their respective 
plants post-merger; hence, the merger allows or facilitates the coordination of pricing or 
                                                 
7  Note it is zero for 1=θ . 
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output. Moreover, if one of the merging firms both produces for an international market 
and has joint economies in the production of domestic and international outputs, then a 
post-merger domestic-output reduction (or lenient competition policy towards domestic 
pricing/output coordination) would correspondingly lead to international output 
contraction. Given the merging firm’s international output contraction, the foreign firm 
would increase output and profit, as their output is a substitute for that of the merging 
firm. The two domestic firms may still experience a joint profit increase; yet, the profit 
gain is due mainly to increased market power, as the domestic prices for both 
(differentiated) products rise. Total output in the foreign market is also likely to fall (i.e., 
the contraction by the domestic firm dominates the output expansion by the foreign firm); 
hence, foreign prices rise. 
 
 Proposition 2 also illustrates the traditional tension between firms and consumers 
with regard to mergers. Following the merger, the net-profit of firms in both domestic 
and foreign markets rises, but consumer surplus falls in both markets. Given this 
profit/consumer-surplus tension, it is interesting to examine whether total surplus in the 
home country increases or decreases post-merger. Consequently, we consider a national 
welfare standard for merger policy; see Bian and McFetridge (2000) for an analysis of the 
range of potential merger-policy standards. To examine this national-welfare effect, we 
follow the standard practice in open economy IO of considering a partial equilibrium 
framework in which domestic consumer demand is derived from a utility function that 
can be approximated by the form: , where z is expenditure on a 
competitively supplied numeraire good, with the price of the numeraire being normalized 
to one, and . The consumer surplus in this framework can be written as: 
, where subscript d stands for ‘domestic’ market. 
Total domestic welfare, denoted , can then be written as:  
zqqu BA +),( 11
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Substitution of (1) and (2) into (22) yields: 
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Differentiating (23) with respect to θ  and using , we obtain:  ii pqu =∂∂ /
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Since  by the first-order condition (9), it follows that: 0'2'22 =−+ AA cqpp
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The signs of the mark-up terms in the brackets of (24) are positive by the first-
order conditions, whereas the signs of the  terms are  and  under 
Proposition 1, and ,  and  under Proposition 2. Accordingly, 
under Proposition 2, the first two terms on the right-hand side of (24) are negative—
reflecting the familiar efficiency loss due to post-merger output contraction in the 
domestic market. More interestingly, the last term on the right-hand side is also 
negative—reflecting firm A’s revenue decline in the international market owing to the 
foreign firm’s output increase. The sign of  is consequently negative, as the decrease 
in domestic consumer surplus will outweigh the merging firms’ profit increase; i.e., 
home-nation welfare falls following an infinitesimal merger.  
iqθ 0
1 <Aqθ 02 >Cqθ
01 <Aqθ 01 <Bqθ 02 >Cqθ
dWθ
 
It is important to dwell on the last term on the right-hand side in equation (24), as 
it is negative under both Propositions 1 and 2 and is unique in an open economy setting—
the term equals zero in a closed-economy setting. The negative sign of this term broadly 
captures the international-competitive-losses driven by the joint-economies effect: non-
synergistic mergers (motivated by market-power and resulting in no post-merger 
‘production rationalization’) reduce home firms’ exports. Further, lower exports reduce 
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the national welfare merits of the merger, which in turn drives a more stringent merger-
review. Consequently, the last term of equation (24) yields a key insight that helps 
generate and formalize empirical tests. Note further that the economic weight of the third 
term will likely be greater when industry sectors are more export-oriented (characterized 
by larger relative values for ). In effect, when both the demand functions and the 
marginal costs are linear, equation (24) can be written as: 
2Aq
 
2)()( Ad qW θβθαθ += ,        (24’) 
 
with α  and β  being (negative) constants; in this case,  is linear in the export 
quantity . Hence, the more export-oriented the industrial sector, the more economic 
weight given to international-competitive-losses. Further, the lower the national-welfare 
merits of a merger, the more skeptical would be a welfare-maximizing antitrust authority.  
dWθ
2Aq
 
The main insight from above can be characterized even more intuitively. Imagine 
a domestic merger involving a marginally negative national-welfare effect in a closed-
economy setting; that same merger in an open-economy setting will be more likely to 
reduce national welfare because the negative impact on exports is now part of a national-
welfare analysis. Further, suppose that a domestic merger marginally improves national 
welfare – owing for example to partial post-merger savings in fixed costs – in a closed-
economy setting; that same merger in an open-economy setting may reduce national 
welfare because the negative impact on exports is now part of a national-welfare analysis. 
Accordingly, non-synergistic domestic mergers involving international-competitive-
losses compound the welfare concerns of a borderline (where the welfare effect is 
marginally negative or positive) merger review. As an aside, the above discussion is in 
direct contrast to Zhang and Chen’s (2002) finding that synergistic mergers (motivated by 
efficiency-gains and resulting in post-merger ‘production rationalization’) enhance home 
firms’ exports, and thereby enhance the national welfare merits of lenient merger policy.8  
                                                 
8  Also note that Zhang and Chen (2002) consider cases involving homogenous products for merging 
firms: where mergers naturally lead to production rationalization (which can include the reduction in 
the number of firms or plants). In contrast, the merging firms produce here differentiated products; 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
 The data are panel in nature: covering U.S. merger policy by industrial sector 
(twenty manufacturing sectors) on an annual basis (the 1990-2001 period). Each panel 
consists of a two-digit SIC manufacturing sectors; for instance, ‘Textile Mill’ is one 
distinct panel consisting of twelve annual observations (1990-2001). While more specific 
sectoral data (such as three or four digit SIC data) would be desired, U.S. antitrust 
authorities publicly report data only at the two-digit level in the FTC and DOJ’s 
combined ‘Annual Report to Congress on Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Enforcement.’9 
Essentially, beyond constructing a data set on a merger-by-merger basis from the ground 
up, the above represents the best publicly available data on U.S. merger enforcement. 
Unfortunately, the state of data on competition policy—both within and across nations—
is rather primitive (Horn and Levinsohn, 2001). Nevertheless, an early debate (Long, 
Schramm & Tollison, 1973; Siegfried, 1975; Preston & Connor, 1992) on the 
implications of disaggregated data for general antitrust policy finds broad industry 
aggregation to bias statistical results downward: i.e., makes it more—not less—difficult 
to detect causal patterns. Further, previous efforts to quantify merger enforcement have 
focused on price-cost margins (e.g., Warzynski, 2001; Hoekman and Kee, 2003) and 
concentration ratios (e.g., Clougherty, 2001); accordingly, this empirical effort represents 
a contribution in itself, as it considers the actual decisions—albeit at a sectoral level—
made by antitrust authorities. 
 
 Testing our main contention requires two principal variables: a measure of 
domestic merger policy (the dependent variable), and a measure of export-orientation (the 
main explanatory variable). Beyond the two principal variables, import-orientation and 
the number of intra-industry mergers are introduced in order to capture some of the other 
drivers of manufacturing-sector merger policy, and in order to make better causal 
                                                                                                                                                 
thus, each firm may continue to operate post-merger out of its respective plant. As a result, each 
partner would produce less than in the absence of merger, owing to the merger’s collusive effect on 
output.  
9  See www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrinfopub.htm for the 1997-2001 ‘Annual Reports to Congress.’ 
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inferences on the main explanatory variable. Accordingly, the basic OLS regression is 
represented here as follows: 
 
Merger-Scrutinyit = b0 + b1*(Export-Orientation)it-1 + b2*(Import-Orientation)it-1 + 
b3*(Intra-Industry-Mergers)it-1 + εit 
 
where i indexes the twenty manufacturing sectors, and t indexes time. The following 
paragraphs explain the variable measures in more depth. 
 
 The dependent variable must capture the state of domestic antitrust scrutiny for a 
particular industry sector. We use the number of annual mergers eliciting a ‘second-
request-investigation’ within a two-digit manufacturing sector as indicating the level of 
antitrust scrutiny for that sector (subsequently referred to as the Merger-Scrutiny 
variable). Second request investigations denote serious concerns on the part of U.S. 
antitrust officials, who will consequently require more information from the merging 
firms, and more time to clear or contest the merger. This level of antitrust scrutiny is a 
pre-requisite for serious remedial measures: such as divestments and outright prevention. 
While a proportion of mergers will be cleared by the 'second-request' procedure, such 
investigations still represent serious antitrust scrutiny: as merging firms will be uncertain 
of the eventual outcome, required to divulge more information, and need to wait longer 
for clearance and completion of their intended strategy. Unsurprisingly, many merging 
parties call off intended mergers when notified of a 'second-request-investigation’. 
Further, the combined FTC/DOJ ‘Annual Report to Congress on Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Enforcement’ reveals this measure of U.S. merger policy.10  
 
 Testing the main contention requires a measure of export-orientation in order to 
examine whether greater export-weights lead to enhanced or reduced scrutiny for mergers 
in manufacturing sectors. The U.S. International Trade Commission reports annual data 
on export levels by two-digit industrial sector; and the U.S. Census Bureau reports data 
                                                 
10  Unfortunately, no other potential measures of merger policy—such as number of prohibitions or 
remedial actions—are reported by industrial sector in the Annual Reports. 
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on total revenue for U.S.-based establishments by two-digit industrial sector. Such 
measures allow the creation (by simply dividing industrial-sector exports by revenue) of 
an export-orientation measure (subsequently referred to as the Export-Orientation 
variable). If the prevailing open-economy IO literature is correct, then export-orientation 
will negatively affect merger-reviews: i.e., the more a particular industry is characterized 
as an exporter, the more lenient are U.S. antitrust authorities with regard to merger 
activity. Yet if our contention is correct, then export-orientation will positively affect 
merger-scrutiny: i.e., the more a particular industry is characterized as an exporter, the 
stricter will U.S. antitrust authorities be with regard to merger activity. 
 
 As already noted, trade-orientation is composed of not only export-orientation, 
but also import-orientation; hence, it is exceedingly important to control for the 
salubrious role imports play regarding domestic merger policy in order to make sound 
causal inferences on export-orientation. As with exports, the U.S. International Trade 
Commission reports annual data on import levels by two-digit industrial sector. Taking 
this measure of imports by industrial sector and dividing by U.S. establishments’ total 
revenue yields a measure of import-orientation (subsequently referred to as the Import-
Orientation variable). In line with the standard economic intuition that trade and 
competition policies are substitutes, we expect import-orientation to negatively impact 
the level of merger scrutiny. 
 
 Mergers that involve acquirers and targets from the same industry sector will 
clearly merit more attention than mergers composed of pairs from separate industry 
sectors. Simply put, received wisdom suggests that conglomerate mergers merit the least 
amount of antitrust concern (though largest amount of stockholder concern). The 
combined FTC/DOJ Annual Report to Congress reveals the number of merger 
transactions characterized by merging parties as intra-industry transactions—transactions 
that are intra-industry in the sense that both the acquirer and target compete in the same 
three-digit industrial sector. The list of explanatory variables consequently includes the 
number of three-digit intra-industry mergers occurring within a two-digit manufacturing 
sector (subsequently referred to as the Intra-Industry-Mergers variable). We expect the 
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Intra-Industry-Mergers variable to positively affect Merger-Scrutiny; thus, the more intra-
industry-mergers in an industrial sector, the more regulators should scrutinize the mergers 
and acquisitions taking place. 
 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the data for the twenty manufacturing 
sectors. The top-half reports the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients 
for the four main variables. Note that amongst the explanatory variables no correlation 
coefficients are reported above the ‘.5’ benchmark for eliciting further concern regarding 
collinearity. The lower half of Table 1 provides more detailed description on the 
manufacturing sectors that make up the data. Note that the data are ‘almost’ balanced in 
that all the panels—with the exception of tobacco—involve a full 12 observations over 
the 1990-2001 period. 
 
**** Table 1 Here **** 
 
4.1 Econometric Issues 
 
 In order to properly estimate the proposed regression model, a few econometric 
issues should be considered. This section considers four particular issues: 1) serial 
correlation; 2) panel data properties; 3) reciprocal-causation concerns; and 4) a left-
censored dependent variable. 
 
 First, time-series data often exhibit serial-correlation – a relationship amongst 
disturbance terms – which leads to inefficient coefficient estimates and calls for remedial 
measures. Further, our empirical estimations are likely to experience serial correlation as 
the regression models are not fully specified: a number of factors that might impact the 
tenor of merger policy in a particular sector (e.g., market-concentration, entry-barriers 
and demand-elasticity) are not controlled for due to data limitations. Accordingly, it is no 
surprise then that the Durbin-Watson statistic for the OLS regression (Regression #1 in 
Table 2) indicates positive autocorrelation. In line with the contention that the 
underspecified nature of the regression model drives positive autocorrelation, once 
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industry fixed-effects are controlled for (Regression #3 in Table 2) positive 
autocorrelation is no longer indicated; though, ‘potential’ negative autocorrelation is 
indicated. Negative autocorrelation is less worrisome as it leads to over-estimation (verse 
under-estimation as with positive autocorrelation) of the variance for coefficient 
estimates. Nevertheless, we go on to employ Park’s (1967) method (essentially a first-
differencing weighted by an estimated first order auto-regressive parameter and then a 
GLS estimation) for removing first-order autocorrelation from panel data (Regression #4 
in Table 2). 
 
Second, panel data often require a choice between fixed-effects and random-
effects. Fixed-effect models are called for when the panel-specific effects are unique and 
unrelated to other panels, while random-effect models are often employed when panel 
specific effects might be related amongst panels (Hsiao, 1986; Greene, 1990). Further, 
Wooldridge (2002) notes that first-differencing represents a viable third-option for 
estimating panel data; particularly when serial correlation (see the first issue above) is a 
concern. In order to underscore the robustness of our results, we report regression 
estimations employing all three techniques—fixed-effect, random-effect and first-
differencing (the Parks method referred to above)—for estimating panel data. As an 
aside, F-tests for the incremental contribution of an added explanatory variable support 
the non-inclusion of period-effects in the regression equations—an observation in line 
with findings that mergers tend to cluster by industry within merger-waves (Andrade, 
Mitchell & Stafford, 2001).  
 
 Third, reciprocal-causation and simultaneity-bias represent two additional 
econometric concerns. With reciprocal causation, the principal danger is that the 
dependent variable (merger-scrutiny) potentially affects the main explanatory variable 
(export-orientation); hence, the coefficient estimates would lead to spurious causal 
inferences (Maddala, 1992). Such reciprocal causation would not be so surprising since 
our theoretical justifications suggest that lax merger policy reduces exports and strict 
merger policy enhances exports; yet, unreported Granger (1969) tests do not support 
reciprocal causation concerns. With simultaneity-bias, the principal danger is that any 
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endogeneity on the part of the explanatory variables that leads to correlation with the 
regression’s error term would violate the assumptions of the classical least-squares 
method and lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates. Unreported, regression 
specifications that omit intra-industry-mergers (potentially, contemporaneous with the 
dependent variable) suggest that the coefficient estimates for Export-Orientation are not 
affected by such concerns. Despite the evidence that reciprocal-causation and 
simultaneity-bias are not problematic with our estimations, we lag all the explanatory 
variables by one period in order to mitigate these potential econometric concerns.11
 
 Fourth, the dependent variable—Merger Scrutiny—exhibits left-censoring at zero: 
i.e., the observed data contains a clustering of zeros and no negative values in terms of 
the annual number of second-request-investigations for a particular industry sector. Such 
truncation of the data does not allow expressing any latent negative values for second-
request-investigations; thus, calling for a Tobit estimation for censored data (Tobin, 
1958). 
 
 The regression models reported in the panel data regression results (Table 2) take 
the above econometric issues into account. Regression #1 reports the standard OLS 
regression and indicates positive autocorrelation. Regression #2 incorporates a random-
effect specification in order to control for any random panel-specific effects. Regression 
#3 reports a fixed-effect specification – to control for any fixed panel-specific effects – 
that indicates potential negative autocorrelation. Regression #4 reports the estimation 
results for the Parks method where the autocorrelation effect is removed. Note that the 
Park’s method reports only 228 observations, as the data for Tobacco manufacturing 
needed to be dropped since this method requires balanced panels. Regression #5 reports a 
Tobit-estimation with fixed effects in order to control for the limited nature of the 
dependent variable and control for any fixed panel-specific effects. 
 
**** Table 2 Here **** 
                                                 
11  We thank the advice of an anonymous referee for this simple procedure to alleviate any reciprocal-
causation and/or simultaneity-bias concerns.  
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4.2 Results and Interpretation 
 
 Table 2 presents the empirical results of the five regression models. All five 
regression equations indicate decent model-specification: with R-squares ranging from 
.14 in Regression #2 to 0.84 in Regression #4. More importantly, the five models 
generate reasonably consistent and significant results for the coefficient estimates: all the 
common variables exhibit the same sign and statistical significance—except insignificant 
coefficient estimates for Import-Orientation in Regression’s #3 & #5. Due to the general 
consistency of results across regression models, the following analysis and interpretation 
discusses the empirical results using a variable-by-variable approach. 
 
 The Export-Orientation variable is instrumental in testing the main contention: the 
more export-oriented an industry, the more vigilant will a national antitrust authority be 
with regard to domestic merger activity. The coefficient estimate for Export-Orientation 
is positive, as contended, and significant in each regression equation. Regression #1 
yields the most conservative coefficient estimate of 8.59; thus, suggesting that industry's 
experiencing an increase in their export-orientation by 11.6 percentage points (recall that 
export-orientation measures exports as a percent of U.S. establishment revenue) would 
encounter an additional merger investigation per annum. The economic significance of 
the coefficient estimate can be further illustrated by noting that the average Export-
Orientations for Industrial Machinery (0.284) and Printing & Publishing (0.023) suggest 
that Industrial-Machinery sector would experience an additional 2.25 second-request-
investigations per year holding other things constant. Accordingly, the empirical evidence 
supports our contention that more export-oriented industries experience higher levels of 
merger-scrutiny. 
 
 The Import-Orientation variable is less robust than Export-Orientation: the 
coefficient estimate is negative as predicted in all five regression equations, but is 
insignificant in Regression’s #3 & #5. Adopting the somewhat conservative coefficient 
estimate of –2.02 from Regression #1 suggests that industry’s experiencing an increase in 
their import orientation by 49.5 percentage points (where import-orientation measures 
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imports as a percentage of U.S. establishment revenue) would encounter one less merger 
investigation per annum. Accordingly, the empirical evidence generally supports the 
mainstream received-wisdom that imports act as a substitute for stringent domestic 
merger policy; yet, the economic weight of imports on U.S. merger policy is relatively 
limited—unsurprising in light of the strong weight given to domestic factors (versus 
international factors) by U.S. public policy. 
 
 The Intra-Industry-Mergers variable is included to make better causal inference 
on the Export-Orientation variable. Recall that we expected a positive sign for the Intra-
Industry-Mergers coefficient estimate, as industries experiencing greater amounts of 
intra-industry merger activity should merit enhanced merger scrutiny by regulators. As 
expected, the coefficient estimate for Intra-Industry-Mergers is positive and significant in 
all five regression-equations. The coefficient estimate in Regression #3 & #5 of 0.014 is 
the most conservative estimate and suggests that an industry experiencing an additional 
seventy-one intra-industry-mergers will encounter an additional merger investigation per 
annum. Accordingly, the empirical evidence generally supports the conventional intuition 
that intra-industry mergers (as opposed to conglomerate mergers) elicit greater merger 
scrutiny.   
 
 In sum, the empirical results support our contention that the more export-oriented 
an industrial sector the more antitrust authorities practice strict merger policy. 
Consequently, there appears to be scant evidence in support of U.S. authorities practicing 
lenient merger policy in export-oriented industrial sectors. Instead, U.S. antitrust 
authorities appear to practice strict merger policy when industrial sectors are 
characterized as exporters. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 The primary objective of the present paper is to provide a caution about the 
problems of relaxing competition policy for reasons relating to export activity. Our work 
was motivated by the conformity in the ‘open-economy industrial organization’ literature 
with regard to export-orientation enhancing the optimality of lenient merger policy—a 
conformity that is confounded by a few observations. First, none of the recent open-
economy IO studies proffer empirical evidence. Second, merger synergies support the 
international-competitive-gains dynamic which rests behind export-orientation favoring 
lenient merger policy; yet, mergers seldom generate significant synergies. Third, a 
number of effects (joint-economies, reduced-competitors & reduced-rivalry) may reverse 
the prevailing relationship between merger policy and international competitiveness.  
 
 Accordingly, we contend that export-orientation favors strict (not lenient) 
domestic merger policy. In making this claim, we focus on how a joint-economies effect 
might favor export-orientation leading to strict merger policy. In this context, merging 
firms benefit from the increased collusion made possible by a domestic merger; yet, the 
reduction in domestic production leads to reduced exports—via joint-economies of 
production between domestic and foreign output—which in turn leads to reduced national 
welfare. In order to support this claim, we develop a model illustrative of how non-
synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national 
welfare and incur stringent merger-reviews. Further, using a panel data set composed of 
U.S. merger reviews by manufacturing sector over the 1990-2001 period, we empirically 
support export-orientation leading to strict (not lenient) merger policy.  
 
One obvious limitation of this work involves our not explicitly testing the joint-
economies effect. This omission owes to our inability to elicit the types of mergers 
notified to US antitrust authorities, and to the potential for other effects to produce the 
same prediction: lenient merger policy leading to international competitive losses. For 
instance, one additional effect (a reduced-competitors effect) was broached within the 
analysis, and entailed lenient merger policy reducing exports (and thereby national 
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welfare) by reducing the number of home-nation international competitors—where 
competitors act as a strategic commitment in international markets. Even further, one 
could posit a reduced-rivalry effect that would entail lenient merger policy reducing 
exports and national-welfare via the reduced international efficiency of home-nation 
competitors—an efficiency reduction permitted by a slack domestic competitive 
environment with less rivalry (Porter, 1990). Accordingly, important extensions to this 
work are two-fold: first, analyzing and testing the joint-economies effect with more 
precision; second, analyzing additional drivers -- beyond the joint-economies effect -- 
behind how domestic mergers (lenient merger policy) might generate international 
competitive losses (reduced national welfare).  
 
 In terms of policy implications, one interesting walk-away from this study regards 
small open-economies: where trade-orientation—and the composite import and export 
orientation measures—is high. A number of small open-economies have resisted the 
adoption of competition policies (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore) with the stated 
rationalization that trade policy acts as a substitute for domestic competition policy.12 
This analysis certainly supports the mainstream intuition that imports act as a substitute 
for stringent merger policy; however, our findings with regard to export-orientation 
suggest an additional welfare rationale behind adopting merger policy. In short, the more 
import-oriented an economy the less incentive is there to invest in sound merger policy; 
yet, the more export-oriented an economy (and small open-economies are big exporters 
as well as big importers) the more incentive there is to invest in sound merger policy.  
 
 Implications on a broader scale involve the ongoing WTO talks where the merits 
of harmonizing cross-national competition policies have sparked interest. One of the 
proffered benefits of harmonization is that it will curb export-oriented nations from 
engaging in beggar-thy-neighbor lenient merger policies. Yet the results here suggest that 
such concerns may be unwarranted—at least with respect to the US. Instead of engaging 
in lenient merger policy, nations with export-oriented sectors may actually conduct strict 
                                                 
12  Singapore has just announced that it would enact a comprehensive pro-competition law in the next 
few years. 
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merger policy. The key of course is that the beggar-thy-neighbor dynamic is non-existent 
in our analysis (i.e., international competitive gains are hard to come by or dubious). One 
limitation of our study is that we only present data on the US environment; though, the 
US environment is an important one and involves relatively good data vis-à-vis other 
nations. Cross-national empirical work is, nevertheless, called for before debate closure 
and the resultant definitive policy implications—so it remains an open question as to 
whether export-oriented sectors in other nations are also characterized by relatively strict 
merger policy. Yet, the burden of proof with regard to the merits of cross-national 
harmonization of competition policies remains with those who desire to change the status 
quo. 
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Figure 1: Equilibria in the Domestic Market 
 
 
J 
qA1J      qA1E
RB
E 
RA
qA1
qB1
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Equilibria in the Foreign Market 
 
 
RA 
    qA1 = qA1E
EO
     qA2M      qA2O
RC
EM
RA 
    qA1 = qA1J
qA2
qC2
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Correlation Coefficients, Means & Standard Deviations 
for all 237 Observations 
 
 Merger-Scrutiny Export-Orientation Import-Orientation Intra-Industry-
Mergers 
 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
 
2.106 
2.676 
 
0.123 
0.079 
0.245 
0.306 
25.591 
31.640 
Merger-Scrutiny 
 
 
1.0 
 
   
Export-Orientation 0.273 
(0.0001) 
 
1.0 
 
  
Import-Orientation -0.212 
(0.0010) 
 
0.422 
(0.0001) 
1.0  
Intra-Industry-Mergers 0.582 
(0.0001) 
0.242 
(0.0002) 
-0.186 
(0.0041) 
1.0 
 
( ) = p-values 
    
 
Means & Observation Numbers 
by Manufacturing Sector 
 
 Merger-Scrutiny Export-Orientation Import-Orientation Intra-Industry-
Mergers 
 
Food & Kindred (12) 6.667 0.053 0.045 62.083 
Tobacco (9) 0.222 0.130 0.011 1.556 
Textile Mill (12) 0.333 0.076 0.093 11.333 
Apparel & Other (12) 0.083 0.091 0.579 6.667 
Lumber & Wood (12) 0.333 0.072 0.105 11.083 
Furniture & Fixtures (12) 0.167 0.058 0.167 6.083 
Paper & Allied (12) 1.250 0.081 0.092 17.833 
Printing & Publishing (12) 2.750 0.023 0.014 50.250 
Chemicals & Allied (12) 7.417 0.155 0.108 63.083 
Petroleum & Coal (12) 1.083 0.041 0.080 6.917 
Rubber & Misc. Plastic (12) 1.000 0.080 0.114 30.083 
Leather (12) 0.000 0.174 1.316 0.167 
Stone, Clay & Glass (12) 1.250 0.060 0.109 13.500 
Primary Metals (12) 2.250 0.115 0.190 19.917 
Fabricated Metals (12) 1.250 0.078 0.083 29.500 
Industrial Machinery (12) 4.833 0.284 0.282 54.917 
Electronic & Electric (12) 2.833 0.277 0.354 49.500 
Transportation (12) 2.917 0.208 0.274 27.750 
Instruments & Related (12) 4.333 0.213 0.182 36.083 
Misc. Manufacturing (12) 0.667 0.194 0.637 7.500 
     
( ) = Observations by Manufacturing Sector 
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Table 2: Panel Data Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Merger-Scrutiny (Second-Request-Investigations) 
 Regression 1 
OLS 
Estimation 
Regression 2 
Random-Effect 
Estimation 
Regression3 
Fixed-Effect 
Estimation 
Regression 4  
Parks 
Estimation 
Regression 5 
Tobit with 
Fixed-Effect 
Estimation 
Explanatory Variables 
 
     
Constant 0.51* 
(0.26) 
0.76 
(0.54) 
5.18*** 
(0.57) 
1.12*** 
(0.06) 
5.02*** 
(0.74) 
Export-Orientation t-1 8.59*** 
(2.03) 
12.02*** 
(4.01) 
13.19** 
(6.45) 
13.76*** 
(1.29) 
17.88* 
(9.49) 
Import-Orientation t-1 -2.02*** 
(0.52) 
-2.50** 
(1.07) 
-1.96 
(1.93) 
-5.08*** 
(0.22) 
-4.42 
(4.81) 
Intra-Industry-Mergers t-1 0.04 *** 
(0.005) 
0.018 *** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Tobacco   -6.68*** 
(0.98) 
 -8.90*** 
(1.45) 
Textile Mill   -5.82*** 
(0.72) 
 -7.45*** 
(1.05) 
Apparel & Other   -5.27*** 
(1.15) 
 -6.97*** 
(2.53) 
Lumber & Wood   -5.75*** 
(0.71) 
 -7.05*** 
(1.02) 
Furniture & Fixtures   -5.53*** 
(0.74) 
 -7.41*** 
(1.25) 
Paper & Allied   -5.07*** 
(0.71) 
 -5.18*** 
(0.92) 
Printing & Publishing   -3.42*** 
(0.67) 
 -3.49*** 
(0.86) 
Chemicals & Allied   -0.49 
(0.88) 
 -0.81 
(1.17) 
Petroleum & Coal   -4.58*** 
(0.70) 
 -4.90*** 
(0.94) 
Rubber & Misc. Plastics   -5.44*** 
(0.70) 
 -5.80*** 
(0.93) 
Leather   -4.90** 
(2.22) 
 -15.63 
(12602) 
Stone, Clay & Glass   -4.70*** 
(0.70) 
 -4.89*** 
(0.94) 
Primary Metals   -4.35*** 
(0.78) 
 -4.36*** 
(1.11) 
Fabricated Metals   -5.22*** 
(0.69) 
 -5.57*** 
(0.90) 
Industrial Machinery   -4.31*** 
(1.44) 
 -4.81** 
(2.01) 
Electronic & Electric   -6.01*** 
(1.38) 
 -6.40*** 
(2.02) 
Transportation   -4.86*** 
(1.10) 
 -5.10*** 
(1.59) 
Instruments & Related   -3.81*** 
(1.15) 
 -4.29*** 
(1.57) 
Misc. Manufacturing   -5.94*** 
(1.23) 
 -6.18** 
(2.65) 
 
R-squared 
 
.40 
 
.14 
 
.68 
 
.84 
 
Log Likelihood     -362.29 
Durbin-Watson D 1.45  2.16   
Observations 237 237 237 228 237 
(  ) = Standard Errors  *** = 1% Signif.  ** = 5% Signif.  * = 10% Signif. 
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Appendix A 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  i) Rewrite the system (16) in the text as: 
 ,      (A1) BA
BAB
BA
AAB
AA
AAB
AA qqq 1
1
11
2
21
1
11 ππππ θθθ −=++
0222
2
22
1
12 =++ CABCAAABAAAABAA qqq θθθ πππ ,       (A2) 
A
B
BBA
BB
ABA
AB qq 1
1
11
1
11 πππ θθ −=+ ,        (A3) 
0222
2
22 =+ CC CCAC AC qq θθ ππ .        (A4) 
 
In equation (A3),  by the second-order condition (12) and 
 by (14). Thus, if both  and  are positive, then the left-
hand side of (A3) will be negative. This contradicts with the fact that the right-hand side 
of (A3) is positive since . 
011 <BABBπ
0111111 <+= A ABB ABBAAB θπππ 1Aqθ 1Bqθ
0111 <= AABAB qpπ
 ii) From (A4), it follows that . Since  by (12) 
and  by (15),  and  have the opposite signs.  
C
CC
AC
AC
C qq 22
2
22
2 /ππ θθ −= 022 <C CCπ
022 <C ACπ 2Aqθ 2Cqθ
 iii) Substituting  into (A2) and rearranging yields: C CC
AC
AC
C qq 22
2
22
2 /ππ θθ −=
0)( 2
22
2222
22
1
12 =−+ AC
CC
C
AC
AB
CAAB
AA
AAB
AA qq θθ π
ππππ . 
Since by (4) and  by the stability condition, 
 must have the same sign as .   Q.E.D. 
0"12 >−= AABAA cπ 022222222 >− C ACABCAC CCABAA ππππ
2Aqθ
1Aqθ
 
Proof of Lemma 3:  Consider the first case: from (2), firm B’s equilibrium profit can be 
written as: . From the first-order condition (10), it follows that 
 and . Under case (i) we obtain , since 
 and . In this case, therefore, firm B prefers a merger to no 
merger. For firm A, its profit is: . Using first-order 
conditions (8)-(9) and rearranging, we obtain: . It can be easily 
seen that  under case (i). Similarly, we can show that  but  under 
case (ii). Lemma 3 then follows.   Q.E.D.
))(),(()( 31 θθπθπ qqBB =
AB
33 θππ −= 3311 θθθ θπππ qq ABB −= 0>Bθπ
031
3
1 <= pqBπ 01313 <= pqAπ
))(),(),(()( 321 θθθπθπ qqqAA =
3
3
1
1 θθθ πθππ qq ABA +−=
0<Aθπ 0>Aθπ 0<Bθπ
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